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In the twenty years following Loving,1 the Supreme Court de-
cided a number of cases dealing with the family. Although the Court
reasoned that it was protecting marriage and extending such protec-
tion to other forms of families, the perverse effect of these decisions
was to weaken the most traditional family type of all, the nuclear fam-
ily. Adults, and particularly pregnant women and unwed fathers, tri-
umphed in this move towards autonomy and rights.2 The vanquished
included those who depended upon the family for love and suste-
nance: minor children, elderly adults, and longtime homemakers.
This paper discusses these cases from a family law perspective.
Because most of the litigants in these cases have been adults who
needed to establish the existence of a constitutional right in order for
their claims to even be heard by the Supreme Court,3 the Court does
not approach these cases from a family law perspective. The case that
comes the closest to using family law language4 is not one defining
marriage or one seeking to establish some constitutional right. Moore
* Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. I must acknowledge the
helpful suggestions of Frank Buckley, David Coolidge, and W. Sidney Moore. I owe tremendous
intellectual debts to Katharine Bartlett, Mary Ann Glendon, Milton C. Regan, Carl Schneider,
Elizabeth Scott and Lynn Wardle for their earlier work on this topic.
1. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Lynn Wardle warns against the extension of the "rights" movement to children. Lynn
D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional Rights of Children, 27 Loy.
U. CHI. L.J. 321 (1996).
3. Cf. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (I11. 1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1152 (1995) with In
re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993), stay denied, DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301 (1993)
(refusing to become involved in interstate custody disputes).
4. "Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family pre-
cisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.
It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values,
moral and cultural." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977).
1998 Vol. 41 No. 2
Howard Law Journal
is a defensive action by a grandmother trying to prevent the loss of a
home and roots for her progeny.5 It is a case that speaks of childrear-
ing and persevering generations as the essence of family.6
This paper begins in Part II with the Supreme Court's view of
marriage as seen in Loving and shows in Parts III to V how that view
has been distorted as individual adults' and children's rights have been
elevated above institutional concerns. In the more recent decisions
discussed in Part VI, the Court seems to have come full circle, writing
that marriage and family have independent values, again concentrat-
ing on the adults as opposed to their children or the broader society.
II. THE BEGINNING: LOVING V. VIRGINIA (1967)
In Loving7 the Supreme Court discussed the necessity of mar-
riage for the preservation of the individual, family life, and, indeed,
society itself. The Court stated that "[t]he freedom to marry has long
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the 'ba-
sic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and
survival." 8
5. See id. at 494. Mrs. Moore was asked to send away her grandson who had been living
with her since his mother's death. When she refused, the city brought a criminal action against
her for violating the "single family" zoning ordinance. In Moore, the Court admits that this is
not the usual context for deciding cases dealing with family privacy, but reasons that "unless we
close our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family have been ac-
corded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, we cannot avoid apply-
ing the force and rationale of these precedents to the family choice involved in this case." Id. at
501.
6. Id.
7. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
8. Id. at 12 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). Family law about
marriage and divorce is very much state law. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992)
(allowing waiver of the "domestic relations exception" to federal diversity in children's suit
against their father and his paramour for sexual and other abuse, but saying it still applied to
divorce and custody matters); see generally Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the
Federal Courts, 79 IowA L. REV. 1073, 1126 (1994). However, the Loving Court did not cite
Virginia (or District of Columbia) sources for its description of marriage. Though sometimes the
Court counts state laws (for example, those criminalizing abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
134-140 (1973); or those forbidding sodomy, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-94 (1986)), it
seems discomfited by using state language about families, and cites, as here, to its own earlier
opinions. Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), is per-
haps the most famous:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.
In Loving, the Court might have consulted the Virginia case of Alexander v. Kuykendall, 63 S.E.
2d. 746, 747 (Va. 1951), which notes:
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These sentiments were echoed in the divorce case of Boddie v.
Connecticut,9 which guaranteed access to the courts to dissolve
marriages:
[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this soci-
ety's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization
of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due process
does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of inability to
pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution
of their marriages.10
In the cases that followed, the Court focused on the "vital per-
sonal rights"11 part of its analysis,12 abandoning at least for the time
being the institution's important role for educating children and build-
ing a better society. 3
III. THE VITAL PERSONAL RIGHTS: CONTRACEPTION
AND ABORTION
Some scholars maintain that the pivotal change in the Court's at-
titudes about marriage came with a case that wasn't about marriage at
all. 4 Eisenstadt v. Baird5 was one of a series of cases that tested and
Marriage, as defined by Mr. Justice Story, in his Conflict of Laws, sec. 108, is "more
than a mere contract. It is rather to be deemed an institution of society founded upon
the consent and contract of the parties, and in this view it has more peculiarities in its
natural character, operation, and extent of obligation different from what belongs to
ordinary contracts .... Unlike other contracts, it is one instituted by God himself, and
has its foundation in the law of nature. It is the parent, not the child, of civil society."
9. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
10. Id. at 374.
11. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
12. It need not have done so. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources,
Thoughts, Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989). She notes that "[f]eminists angrily
reject the tradition of liberal theory that has felt so alien, so lacking in language and ability to
comprehend our reality .... Id. at 9. She notes that "[i]f we ask ourselves what actually
enables people to be autonomous, the answer is not isolation, but relationships-with parents,
teachers, friends, loved ones-that provide the support and guidance necessary for the develop-
ment and experience of autonomy. I think, therefore, that the most promising model, symbol, or
metaphor for autonomy is not property, but childrearing." Id. at 12. Note the parallels to JOHN
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, ch. VI, Of Paternal Power 67 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690); and HILLARY CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE (1996).
13. See, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993) (talking about what happens when marriage is not the
norm); Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that Grows:" Toward a History of Fam-
ily Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819, 893-94 (emphasizing how the autonomous self fails to protect
values of interdependence). In place of transmitting other values, families may now merely
transfer wealth to children in the form of financing their education. See, e.g., John H. Langbein,
The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 722, 732-36
(1988).
14. See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 39-40
(1993); Margaret G. Farrell, Revisiting Roe v. Wade: Substance and Process in the Abortion De-
1998]
Howard Law Journal
eventually eradicated a series of New England statutes forbidding the
distribution and use of contraceptives. The most important fact about
this case, from a family law perspective at least, was that an unmarried
woman, not a married couple, 6 had received the forbidden contracep-
tives. Just as in Loving, the Court's language is stirring and effective:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married per-
sons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried per-
sons would be equally impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the
right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet
the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.
17
Eisenstadt looms important from a family law perspective be-
cause it separates the rights of the individual spouse from those be-
longing to the married couple. The privacy rights asserted here
belong to the woman, whether married or single. For single women,
Eisenstadt reduced the risk of unwanted pregnancies and laid the
groundwork for the abortion cases that would shortly follow.18 Mean-
while, the responsibility for contraception shifted from the man (who
could purchase condoms even in those states with restrictive contra-
ceptive regimes) to the woman (who could use birth control pills, dia-
phragms, or foam) to prevent pregnancy.' 9
bate, 68 IND. L.J. 269, 302 (1993); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 12 & n.55 (1995) (citing Lawrence Tribe and Mary Ann Glendon); Carl E. Schneider,
The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 514 (1992); Robin West,
Integrity and Universality: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's Freedom's Law, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1313, 1324 (1997).
15. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
16. The landmark contraception case was Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
18. See, e.g., West, supra note 14.
19. See, e.g., June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community,
31 Hous. L. REV. 359, 423 & n.253 (1994); Linda C. McLain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 339, 423 (1996). The woman apparently has the legal responsibility for birth
control in the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China. See Mark Savage, The Law of
Abortion in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China: Women's
Rights in Two Socialist Countries, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1102 & n.393 (1988). For a reflection
on what this shift has meant for premarital bargaining between men and women, see George A.




The abortion cases further distinguished sexual intercourse from
not only childbearing but also marriage. In Roe v. Wade,2" the Court
held that the right to privacy encompassed the woman's right to termi-
nate her pregnancy.21 In addition, the Court held in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth22 that a married woman's
husband did not have the right to veto her decision to obtain an
abortion.23
The Court's reasoning, echoed in the recent case of Casey v.
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania,24 was that, in those mar-
riages where the woman would not voluntarily consult her husband,
he might threaten or actually inflict violence or other retribution upon
her. In particular, Casey discussed the balance of power within the
marital relationship.26 The Court concluded that married women's
equality with their husbands might well be lost were her unilateral
right to obtain an abortion curtailed.27
Minors also gained reproductive freedom. Traditional parental
control over children was upset by the Court's privacy decisions in the
late 1970s. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'1,
28 paralleling Griswold,29
began the trend by announcing that minors, like adult unmarried peo-
ple, have independent rights to privacy involving matters of sexual-
ity.3" Although the Court still presumed that parents still act in their
children's best interests,31 many states have extended the privacy
rights of minors to include rights to obtain treatment for venereal dis-
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). As the Court noted later in Carey v. Population
Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1978), after Eisenstadt and Roe v. Wade, "Griswold may no
longer be read as holding only that a State may not prohibit a married couple's use of contracep-
tives. Read in light of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects
individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State." Id. at 687.
21. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
22. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
23. Id. at 69. The Court noted that where husband and wife disagreed about her abortion,
only one of the husband-wife pair could prevail. Because she physically carried and delivered
the child, the wife had the greater interest in the decision.
24. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa., 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
25. Id. at 887-901.
26. See id.
27. Id. Concerns with equality over solidarity mark much of Mary Ann Glendon's The
Transformation of Family Law: State, Law and Family in the United States and Western Europe
102-143 (1989). She notes that the equality principle has drained marriage of much of its legal
significance. Id. at 95.
28. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
29. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
30. See generally Carey, 431 U.S. at 678.
31. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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eases or mental health problems. 2 While containing dicta about the
importance of the family, the Court allowed the pregnant minor to
terminate her pregnancy without her parent's consent.33 Although a
state may constitutionally require that she notify a parent or obtain
judicial consent,34 Belotti removes this important decision from the
domain of the family.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS FOR
MARRIAGE
How society views children affects how we view marriage. In Ro-
man times,35 children were seen as an extension of the head of the
household, the pater familias.6 As they matured, sons would repre-
sent him as citizens, soldiers, farmers, or tradesmen. The daughters
could secure him social standing through their marriage alliances or
could care for him during old age
7.3
In Catholic doctrine, children are the expression of their parents'
love. 38 They anchor or bind parents together, acting as hostages or
bonds.39 Professor Anthony Padovano, writing from this tradition,
32. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969D (Michie 1994).
33. See Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
34. Id.
35. See PHILLIPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE
(Robert Baldick trans., Knopf 1962) (1960); Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Mar-
riage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 463 (1983). See generally JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN
MEDIEVAL EUROPE 33-34 (1987).
36. Children are seen as "a gift from the Lord" in Psalm 127:3-5 (New American Standard
1973).
Behold, children are a gift of the Lord;
The fruit of the womb is a reward.
Like arrows in the hand of the warrior,
So are the children of one's youth.
How blessed is the man whose quiver is full of them;
they shall not be ashamed,
When they speak with their enemies in the gate.
37. The family, children included, continued to be central throughout early American his-
tory. See, e.g., STEPHEN MINTz & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HIS-
TORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 1 (1988); MICHAEL GROSSBERO, GOVERNINO THE HEARTH:
LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 36 (1985).
38. See, e.g., POPE JOHN PAUL II, Familiaris Consortio [On the Family] No. 21 (1981). Mar-
riage is a communion of two giving rise to a community of persons greater than the two; POPE
JOHN PAUL II, Letter to Families, No. 7, 8 (1994), just as marriage is a mutual gift of self between
husbands and wives, id. No. 11; Teresa Stanton Collett, Marriage, Family and the Positive Law, 10
NOTRE DAME. J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 467, 476 (1996).
39. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATION-
ALITY 37-47 (rev. ed. 1984); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to
Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983); Anthony Kronman, Contracts and the State of
Nature, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 5 (1985); Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody:
[VOL. 41:271276
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notes that "[m]arriage unites the human family more profoundly than
any religion. The world is one with the wedding couple. Children,
born from this union, move us with love more universally than any
other reality. A family is the world's logo, icon, image of harmony,
peace, and affection."4
When the family farm (or estate) declined in importance, chil-
dren, however, ceased to have the same social or economic function.
Consequently, childhood became an "age of man" of its own.4' Today,
children in the Western world are viewed as economic sinkholes and
consumption items.42
Just as marriage performs an important function for children,43
children assist their parents' marriage. For several centuries after ab-
Bonding and Monitoring Theories, 73 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 1998). I must acknowledge that
Frank Buckley had this thought before I did, as frequently happens. Although the idea ap-
peared in various drafts of our paper, I must admit that I was focusing on the bonding the fathers
were doing with their children, not with their wives.
40. Anthony T. Padovano, Marriage: The Most Noble of Human Achievements, 238 CATH.
WORLD 140 (1995). Padovano notes that in the Genesis account of creation, male and female
are created together, and are not asked to pray or obey the Law, but to regenerate the image
and likeness of God through marriage and sexual love.
41. See ARIES, supra note 35; JOHN DEMOS, Images of the American Family, Then and Now,
in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 43 (Virginia Tufte and Barbara Myerhoff eds., Yale U.
Press 1979); JEAN-LOuIS FLANDR1N, FAMILIES IN FORMER TIMES: KINSHIP, HOUSEHOLD AND
SEXUALITY 154-56 (Rochard Southern trans. 1979) (1976); GROSSBERG, supra note 37, at 5; VI-
VIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHIL-
DREN (1985); John Demos, The American Family in Past Time, 43 AM. SCHOLAR 422 (1974).
42. See Margaret F. Brinig, The Family Franchise: Elderly Parents and Adult Siblings, 1996
UTAH L. REV. 393 [hereinafter The Family Franchise]. Children will eventually serve to extend
the family line biologically, but also through its history and reputation. In some instances, chil-
dren may support their parents in old age. This occurs more frequently, of course, in countries
like Japan and Korea. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Limited Horizons: The American Family, 2
INT'L J. CHILDREN'S RTS. (1994); Savings and Demographics: Some International Comparisons, 6
FAM. ECON. REV. 22 (1993).
43. A host of evidence suggests that children do best in two parent, married families. See
James H. Humphrey, Some General Causes of Stress in Children, in STRESS IN CHILDHOOD 3, 6-8
(James Humphrey ed., 1984) (suggesting that children benefit from role models of the same and
opposite gender). See, e.g., sources cited in Margaret F. Brinig, The Marriage Covenant, in THE
FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., forthcoming 1998); DAVID POPE-
NOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER: COMPELLING NEw EVIDENCE THAT FATHERHOOD AND MAR-
RIAGE ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR THE GOOD OF CHILDREN AND SOCIETY (1996); David
Blankenhorn, The State of the Family and the Family Policy Debate, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
431 (1996); William Galston, Causes of Declining Well-Being Among U.S. Children, ASPEN INST.
Q., Winter, 1993 at 52. Parents may act as complements or balance each other. See Ira C. Lupu,
The Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1317 (1994).
For some rather horrifying recent statistics on child abuse, see ROBERT WHELAN, BROKEN
HOMES AND BATIIERED CHILDREN (1993), showing that British children were 33 times more
likely to be abused and 73 times more likely to be killed if living in the home with their mother
and a cohabitant than in an intact family. See generally Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in




solute divorce became possible, it was, except in the most grave cir-
cumstances, unthinkable when there were children. Parents ought to
stay together "for the sake of the children."44 In fact, the proponents
of the Louisiana Covenant Marriage,45 as well as others suggesting
returns to fault divorce, promote such measures because divorce
harms children.46 Because these sentiments linger, it is unsurprising
that the divorce rate is lower where there are more children under
eighteen.
4 7
But do children act "like little anchors ' 48 because we feel guilty
about harming them49 or because they change the fundamental nature
of marriage? When people become parents, children depend upon
them, and they must learn to give unconditionally and to think of
others first.5" Regardless of the various conceptions about marriage
and its duration, children will be a part of their parents forever.51
These ideas relate to the Supreme Court privacy cases because
they suggest that, at least in adolescence and for some purposes, chil-
44. See Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Marriage "For The Sake of The Children": A Feminist
Reply To Elizabeth Scott, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1435 (1992). See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Family
Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553 (1984); Elizabeth Scott, Rational Decisionmaking
About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 31 (1990); Judith T. Younger, Responsible Par-
ents and Good Children, 14 LAW. & INEQ. J. 489 (1996).
45. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 102 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998).
46. See Maggie Gallagher, Marriage Covenants; Louisiana Finds Balm for Divorce Epi-
demic, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 24, 1997, at 27A. Va. House Bill 2624, would amend VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) by adding a subsection (d), which would provide that the no-fault separa-
tion provision:
shall not apply if (i) there are minor children born of the parties, born of either party
and adopted by the other, or adopted by both parties, and (ii) either party files a writ-
ten objection to the granting of a divorce pursuant to this subdivision. Any such writ-
ten objection shall be filed within twenty-one days of service of the initial pleading
requesting a divorce under this section in the court in which such initial pleading was
filed.
See also VICTOR FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 104-10 (1988).
47. See Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault Laws and At Fault People, Irrr'L REV.
OF L. & ECON. (1998 forthcoming); Gary S. Becker, et al., An Economic Analysis of Marital
Instability, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1141 (1977).
48. This phrase is attributable to my aunt, Jean Friedlander.
49. This is one of the suggestions in Brinig & Buckley, Joint Custody, supra note 39. Cf
Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. POL. ECON.
385 (1993) (role of guilt in assuring respect of and support for aged parents).
50. Virginia Held, Mothering versus Contract, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 287, 287-304 (Jane
Mansbridge ed., 1990); Nedelsky, supra note 12, at 7 (1989); Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking
Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181-215 (1995); see also
JUDITH WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, THE GOOD MARRIAGE: HOW AND WHY LOVE
LASTS (1995) (finding that people in happy marriages used the pronoun "we" more often than
most couples, looking at crises as a joint challenge).
51. See generally MARGARET F. BRINIG, THE CONTRACT AND THE COVENANT (forthcom-
ing); Brinig, The Family Franchise, supra note 42.
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dren and their parents function independently rather than as a unit.52
The more children have independent rights "of privacy, religion,53 or
freedom from search" 54 the less the family serves as a moral and social
unit. Providing children with independent rights is another reason
for the disappearance of deep and stable marriage. If parents do not
have to guide and protect their children (or if they do not have any
children at all), they can choose to think about themselves.56
From another perspective, one can consider the family to have a
flow of communication, intimacy and love among its members.5
52. MARY ANN GLENDON, NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 37 (1981).
53. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting);
Comment, Adjudicating What Yoder Left Unresolved: Religious Rights for Minor Children After
Danforth and Carey, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1135 (1978).
54. See, e.g., In re Scott K, 595 P.2d 105 (Cal. 1979); State v. Douglas, 498 A.2d 364 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985). See generally Bruce Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egali-
tarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.
605.
55. See Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of
the Family, 91 ETHICS 8-9 (1980):
We typically pay attention to the rights of individuals in order to stress their moral
independence .... The danger of talk about rights of children is that it may encourage
people to think that the proper relationship between themselves and their children is
the abstract one that the language of rights is forged to suit.
See also MARY AN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
109 (1991) (rights talk disserves public deliberation not only through affirmatively promoting an
image of the rights-bearer as a radically autonomous individual, but through its corresponding
neglect of the social dimensions of human personhood); Hafen, supra note 54; Carl E. Schneider,
Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1835-
70 (1985); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401
(1995); Wardle, supra note 2, at 342-43; Barbara B. Woodhouse, Children's Rights: The Destruc-
tion and Promise of Family, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 497. But see John Holt, Why Not a Bill of
Rights for Children?, in ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD, reprinted in THE CHILDREN'S RIGI-rrs
MOVEMENT: OVERCOMING THE OPPRESSION OF YOUNG PEOPLE 319 (Beatrice Gross & Ronald
Gross eds., 1977); Wendy Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspective &
the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11 (1994); Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris Jonas Freed, A Bill of Rights
for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343 (1972); Richard Farson, Birthrights-A Children's Bill of Rights,
MS. MAGAZINE, Mar. 1974, at 66.
56. Meanwhile, children apparently have more and more time to complain about the jobs
we are doing as parents. See e.g., Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Burnette v. Wahl, 588 P.2d 1105 (Ore. 1978). Dean W. Sidney Moore made this connection for
me.
Unlike American or German law, Glendon notes that in France, a spouse can sue for waste
and mismanagement during the marriage and can seek a court order to protect the community
from a reckless or unfair spouse and to insure that some marital property remains to divide if the
partnership founders. GLENDON, supra note 27, at 121-22.
57. See generally MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY
(1993). This is of course a natural law concept as well. See GLENDON, supra note 55; Thomas L.
Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963, 970-71 (1987). Shaffer
writes:
An alternative argument is that the family created the promises, the contract, the con-
sent, and the circumstantial harmony-not the other way around.... In these ordinary
ways of accounting to ourselves for ourselves, it is the family that causes individuals to
make the promises that begin, develop, and continue families.
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When one channel of this flow stops, the relationships among its mem-
bers change. This is also one way in which the abortion decisions,
regardless of the Constitutional or political necessity" for them, have
changed marriage.
The change can also be seen in law and economics terms. One
measure of the change is in the shrinking degree of specialization be-
tween spouses that exists in most marriages, 59 even those with chil-
dren. Because more married women are working in the paid labor
force, more "household production" comes from outside the relation-
ship as these women contract with others for the services they used to
perform.60 Another change is the perception that Kaldor-Hicks op-
timality, rather than Pareto, is sufficient: the parents need only con-
sider an improvement in their own well-being, disregarding possible
negative externalities inflicted upon their children. Therefore, mar-
riage produces less wealth for women in particular in terms of health
and material goods.6 ' In addition, women, who are arguably inclined
to identify more strongly with their children than are men, feel less
happy.62
V. THE ELEVATION OF SINGLE PARENTHOOD
A number of Supreme Court cases decided since Loving were
designed to decrease the gulf between children whose parents were
married and those whose parents were not.63 Other cases moved to-
ward greater equality between unwed mothers and fathers.64 In em-
phasizing the importance of family functions instead of their legal
forms, marriage has become less significant for the couple contemplat-
ing it and society as a whole.65 Its decline has led to more cohabiting
58. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Brief for the
National Abortion Rights League, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gyne-
cologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Nos. 84-495 and 84-1379).
59. See generally GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 30-42 (2d ed. 1991); Mar-
garet F. Brinig, Comment on Jana Singer's Alimony and Efficiency, 82 GEO. L.J. 2461 (1994).
60. See Margaret F. Brinig, The Law and Economics of No-Fault Divorce, 26 FAM. L.Q. 453,
456-57 & nn.20-22 (1993) (reviewing ALLEN M. PARKMAN, No-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT
WRONG? (1992)); JUNE R. CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS (forthcoming 1998).
61. See Linda J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483 (1995); see also
BRINIG, supra note 51, at 2471-73.
62. See Waite, supra note 61.
63. See Levy v Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Weber v. Aetna Cas. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
64. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
65. The "palimony" cases are now legion. They begin, of course, with Marvin v. Marvin,
557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). See generally Larry L. Bumpass et al., The Role of Cohabitation in
Declining Rates of Marriage, 53 J. MARR. & FAM. 913 (1991); Herma Hill Kay & Carol Amyx,
Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CAL. L. REV. 937 (1977). Some of these problems
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relationships. Without marriage, however, societal problems increase,
if only because cohabiting relationships are so much less stable.66
The first case in this group that collapsed the difference between
marital and non-marital parenting is Levy v. Louisiana,67 decided only
a year after Loving. Levy struck down the Louisiana wrongful death
statute that gave only legitimate children the right to sue a tortfeasor.
The Court found that it was wrong to look at the parent's marital sta-
tus to define the relationship between a mother and her children:
"These children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she
cared for them and nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the bio-
logical and in the spiritual sense; in her death they suffered wrong in
the sense that any dependent would."6 8 In 1972, any distinction be-
tween unwed mothers and fathers in wrongful death proceedings was
invalidated in Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.6 9 Again, the
Court stressed the parental function being performed rather than the
parent's marital status.7°
The "functional family" approach was stretched to its limit in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland.71 The Court struck down a housing
ordinance that defined "single family dwelling" to exclude a grand-
mother and her grandsons because they were not her biological chil-
are exacerbated by the lack of any direct payment for housework in marriage. See, e.g., Nancy
C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L. J. 1571 (1996); Katherine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into
Love: Housework and the Law, 91 N.W. U. L. REv. 1 (1996). See generally Note, Looking for a
Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family,
104 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1991).
66. See, e.g., Sally Cuningham Clarke and Barbara Foley Wilson, The Relative Stability of
Remarriages: A Cohort Approach Using Vital Statistics, 43 FAM. REL. 305 (1994).
67. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
68. Id. at 72.
69. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
70. [T]he dependency and natural affinity of the unacknowledged illegitimate children
for their father were as great as those of the four legitimate children whom Louisiana
law has allowed to recover. The legitimate children and the illegitimate children all
lived in the home of the deceased and were equally dependent upon him for mainte-
nance and support.
Id. at 169-70. The functional family approach arguably reached its zenith in Butcher v. Superior
Court of Orange County, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 511 (1983), where an unmarried cohabitant was
permitted to sue for loss of consortium. The court noted that "[t]he relationship of unmarried
cohabitants possesses every characteristic of the spousal relationship except formalization." An-
other functional family case is Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989), where
the survivor of a gay couple was allowed as a family member to inherit the deceased's rent
controlled apartment. "The intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest on ficti-
tious legal distinctions or genetic history, but should find its foundation on the reality of family
life. In the context of eviction, a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family
includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an
emotional and financial commitment and interdependence." Id. at 53-54.
71. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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dren.72 After citing a number of cases establishing parental rights, the
Court reasoned that "unless we close our eyes to the basic reasons
why certain rights associated with the family have been accorded shel-
ter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, we can-
not avoid applying the force and rationale of these precedents to the
family choice involved in this case."73 The Court went on to note: "By
the same token the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from stan-
dardizing its children-and its adults-by forcing all to live in certain
narrowly defined family patterns."74
While the plaintiffs in question in cases like Levy, Weber, and
Moore were clearly sympathetic, the single fathers in a number of
other cases heard by the Court during this period had neither married
their children's mothers nor otherwise legitimated their children.
Nonetheless, single fathers were entitled to at least a hearing75 and the
opportunity to become custodial parents.76 Natural parents' rights,
72. The Census Bureau reports a dramatic increase in the number of households headed by
grandparents who are raising children alone from under 950,000 in 1990 to nearly 1,500,000 in
1995. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P20-484, MARI-
TAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS (1994).
73. Moore, 431 U.S. at 501.
74. Id. at 506. For another discussion of Moore, see Frederick E. Dashiell, Note, The Right
of Family Life: Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 6 BLACK L.J. 288, 295 (1980) (concluding that
the Moore decision is especially important to black family life because of the economic and
social plight of black citizens).
75. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), quoted from several of the bedrock parents'
rights cases, saying:
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to con-
ceive and to raise one's children have been deemed "essential," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923), "basic civil rights of man," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942), and "rights far more precious ... than property rights," May v. Anderson, 345
U.S. 528, 533 (1953). "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include prepara-
tion for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). Id. at 651.
Moore should be distinguished from another "functions" case, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 2-3, 7 (1974) (upholding another "single family" zoning ordinance that prevented
most groups of unrelated persons, such as college roommates, from living together because they
lacked a fundamental right to live together).
76. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979)
(because unwed mothers had an opportunity to block their children's adoption, so did unwed
fathers). The only significant break upon the growing rights given to unwed fathers appears in
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), in which the father who had previously enjoyed no
significant contact with his children tried to block their adoption by the mother's new husband.
Unlike Stanley, this was "not a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or sought, actual
or legal custody of his child." Nor is this a case in which the proposed adoption would place the
child with a new set of parents with whom the child had never before lived. Rather, the result of
the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit already in existence, a result
desired by all concerned, except appellant. Whatever might be required in other situations, we
cannot say that the State was required in this situation to find anything more than that the
adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the "best interests of the child." Id. at 255.
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even though the children had been temporarily removed on grounds
of their unfitness, were stronger than those given under foster parents
contracts.77 Fathers, like mothers, enjoyed significant rights in their
children that would not easily be abrogated even through miscon-
duct.7 ' Another example of paternal rights is that an out-of-state fa-
ther is entitled to more than actual notice before a mother could
collect child support from him.7 9
VI. COMING FULL CIRCLE: MICHAEL H. V. GERALD D.
The trend toward approval of single parenthood finally halted.
The Court began to approve of marriage rather than other less tradi-
tional family forms. However, it did so as the result of the actions of
adults rather than upon a consideration of the best interests of the
children involved.8" The first of these cases is Zablocki v. Redhail,s l in
which the Court held that a father could not be denied the right to
marry because he had not assured the Court that he had met the child
77. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844-45 (1977), held that foster
parents were not entitled to a pre-removal hearing before the children in their care were re-
turned to the birth parents or moved to another set of foster parents. Justice Brennan wrote for
the Court: "[W]here a child has been placed in foster care as an infant, has never known his
natural parents, and has remained continuously for several years in the care of the same foster
parents, it is natural that the foster family should hold the same place in the emotional life of the
foster child.., as a natural family. For this reason, we cannot dismiss the foster family as a mere
collection of unrelated individuals." On the other hand, foster parents "do contract to return a
child on request and any recognition of a constitutional protection for the foster family relation
would create 'virtually unavoidable . . . tension' with the rights of the biologic family." See
generally David Chambers & Michael Wald, Smith v. Offer: A Case Study of Children in Foster
Care, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985).
78. See Foster Families, 431 U.S. at 816, 844-45.
79. Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). The court noted:
In seeking to justify the burden that would be imposed on appellant were the exercise
of in personam jurisdiction in California sustained, appellee argues that California has
substantial interests in protecting the welfare of its minor residents and in promoting to
the fullest extent possible a healthy and supportive family environment in which the
children of the State are to be raised. These interests are unquestionably important.
But while the presence of the children and one parent in California arguably might
favor application of California law in a lawsuit in New York, the fact that California
may be the "center of gravity" for choice-of-law purposes does not mean that Califor-
nia has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Id. at 98.
80. For discussions of the case in family law terms, see Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling
Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental
Preference and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615 (1992); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatch-
ing the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1992).
81. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). Redhail has been criticized because, since it
was couched in constitutional terms, the Court sent "the symbolic message that free men and
women possess not only the power but the 'right' to assume new commitments in derogation of




support obligations from another relationship.8" He had this right be-
cause, as the Court had already found in Carey v. Population Services
International:3
While the outer limits of [the right of personal privacy] have not
been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that
an individual may make without unjustified government interfer-
ence are personal decisions relating to marriage, 4 procreation,85
86 8contraception, family relationships, 7  and child rearing and
education.
88
The Redhail Court also noted the line of cases establishing access
to the court system, especially in disputes regarding marriage.89
The second case, Bowers v. Hardwick,90 is a decision many find
hard to explain after the seemingly inexorable advance of adult pri-
vacy rights.9" In Bowers, the Court again connects family, marriage,
and childrearing:
No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one
hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated,
either by the Court of Appeals or by respondent. Moreover, any
claim that these cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that
any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is
constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable.
Indeed, the Court's opinion in Carey twice asserted that the privacy
82. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 390.
83. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).
84. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
85. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
86. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S., at 453-54; id., at 460, 463-65 (White, J., concur-
ring in result)).
87. Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
88. Id. (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
89. Id. at 385 & n.10. According to the Court:
Further support for the fundamental importance of marriage is found in our decisions
dealing with rights of access to courts in civil cases. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971), we wrote that "marriage involves interests of basic importance in our soci-
ety" id. at 376, and held that filing fees for divorce actions violated the due process
rights of indigents unable to pay the fees.
90. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Bowers upheld Georgia's criminalizing adult
consensual homosexual sodomy.
91. Given a close reading of cases like Roe v. Wade, which rely on the history of state
sanctions against abortion, the only real explanation for upholding Georgia's ban in view of the
diminishing legislative prohibitions of sodomy seems to be moral repugnance against same-sex
sexual conduct. See, e.g., Abby R. Rubenfeld, Lessons Learned: A Reflection upon Bowers v.
Hardwick, 11 NOVA L. REV. 59 (1986); Ali Khan, The Invasion of Sexual Privacy, 23 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 957 (1986); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
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right, which the Griswold line of cases found to be one of the pro-
tections provided by the Due Process Clause, did not reach so far.
92
But procreation and even conjugal life are not necessarily part of
marriage. The third case, Turner v. Safley,93 affirmed inmates' rights
to marry without securing permission from prison authorities. The
Court stressed the affection and adult rights that are secured by
wedlock:
Many important attributes of marriage remain, however, after tak-
ing into account the limitations imposed by prison life. First, inmate
marriages, like others, are 'expressions of emotional support and
public commitment. These elements are an important and signifi-
cant aspect of the marital relationship. In addition, many religions
recognize marriage as having spiritual significance; for some in-
mates and their spouses, therefore, the commitment of marriage
may be an exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of per-
sonal dedication. Third, most inmates eventually will be released by
parole or commutation, and therefore most inmate marriages are
formed in the expectation that they ultimately will be fully consum-
mated. Finally, marital status often is a pre-condition to the receipt
of government benefits (e. g., Social Security benefits), property
rights (e. g., tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), and other,
less tangible benefits (e. g., legitimation of children born out of wed-
lock). These incidents of marriage, like the religious and personal
aspects of the marriage commitment, are unaffected by the fact of
confinement or the pursuit of legitimate corrections goals.94
92. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
93. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). See generally Cahn, supra note 8, at 1126; June
Carbone, Morality, Public Policy and the Family: The Role of Marriage and the Public/Private
Divide, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 267, 286 (1996); David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage?
Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 119 (1997); Michael J.
Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices Black And Scalia, 74 B.U.
L. REV. 25, 66 (1992); Steven K. Homer, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 530
(1994); Katheryn D. Katz, Majoritarian Morality and Parental Rights, 88 ALB. L. REV. 405, 469
(1988); Earl M. Maltz, Constitutional Protection for the Right to Marry: A Dissenting View, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949 (1992); Robert G. Spector, The Nationalization of Family Law: An
Introduction to the Manual for the Coming Age, 27 FAM. L.Q. 1, 5 (1993); Maura I. Strassberg,
Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L.
REV. 1501, 1558-60 (1997); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching The Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 1747, 1865 (1993); Woodhouse, supra note
81, at 273-75 (1990); Judith T. Younger, Marriage, Divorce, and the Family: A Cautionary Tale, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1367 (1993); Arthur S. Leonard, Going For The Brass Ring: The Case For
Same-Sex Marriage, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 572, 593 (1997) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT
(1996)).
94. Safley, 482 U.S. at 95-96. Though the Court's personnel had not changed after Bowers'
rejection of the legality of same-sex conduct, so that a recognition of same-sex marriage was not
likely, obviously the reasons put forward by the Turner plaintiffs are very close to the reasons
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Michael H. is the fourth case decided in the 1967-1990 period in
which the Court looked back almost wistfully at traditional marriage,
giving at least lip service to the most familiar family form. 95 In this
case, the Court rejects the plea of a biological father for a relationship
with the daughter conceived in an adulterous relationship.96 It is yet
another case involving a child where all the majority's concern seems
to be for the adult rights involved.97 The Court does distinguish the
Stanley line of cases by noting that they "rest ... upon the historic
respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term-tradition-
ally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary fam-
ily."' 98 Although the Court rewarded the attempts of the wronged
husband to hold together his marriage and family, it could well have
reached the same result by acknowledging the effect of these choices
on the child, Victoria. For her, despite the allegations of her mother,
who sought to maintain her own liberty interest by excluding Michael
from his daughter's life, 99 the family law question was whether Victo-
ria must grow up torn between the pulls of two fathers or in the tradi-
tional two-parent family. Again, the Court neglects the way that
children diminish adult autonomy in marriage.
VII. CONCLUSION
After more than twenty years of Court pronouncements on the
family, the legal analysis of family issues is still a bit confused. The
gay and lesbian couples seek to marry as opposed to gaining relief through cohabitation con-
tracts or domestic partnership registration.
95. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
96. Id.
97. For some commentary on the case, see Linda R. Crane, Family Values and the Supreme
Court, 25 CoNN. L. REV. 427 (1993); Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 1787 (1993); Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and
Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1569-71 (1994); Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathers and Adoption: A
Theoretical Analysis in Context, 72 TEX. L. REV. 967 (1994); Marsha Garrison, Parents' Rights vs.
Children's Interests: The Case of the Foster Child, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 371, 396
(1996); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain
Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 404-05, 411 (1994); Lynn Kirsch,
Note, Unwed Fathers and Their Newborn Children Placed for Adoption: Protecting the Rights of
Both in Custody Disputes, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 1011, 1031-33 (1994); Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fa-
therhood, Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TUL. L. REV. 585,
587, 595 (1991); Linda C. McClain, Rights And Irresponsibility, 43 DUKE L.J. 989, 1088 (1994);
Schneider, supra note 14; Barbara B. Woodhouse, supra note 55, at 505-06, 515 (1993); Judith T.
Younger, Responsible Parents and Good Children, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 489-93 (1994).
98. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989).
99. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 110.
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cases are not written in the "language of love"'100 or even in family law
language speaking to the "best interests of the child," '' but in the
harsher language of rights.1 " These decisions vindicate the choices
and inclinations of adults, reflecting an America that increasingly
views marriage as an emotional and impermanent relationship. 1 3 The
permanence, commitment, and unconditional nurturing of marriage'0 4
and parenthood are mostly ignored.
100. See Robert F. Drinan, Sovereignty and Human Rights, 20 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 75, 86
(1994); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjusting Wives' Rights to
Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2211 (1994).
101. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973).
102. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 27, at 295-306; see also Woodhouse, supra note 81, at 2.
103. See, e.g., MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE (1996); Barbara Dafoe
Whitehead, Can Marriage Be Rescued?, COMMONWEAL, May 17, 1996, at 18 (reviewing RICH-
ARD WEISSBOURD, THE VULNERABLE CHILD (1996) & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE ABOLITION
OF MARRIAGE (1996)); Frank Furstenberg, The Future of Marriage, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, June
1996, at 34 (noting that marriage is too often something that only the relatively wealthy can
afford because of lack of social supports for the institution).
104. In the traditional marriage service, the husband promised to comfort his wife. The Ox-
ford English Dictionary defines comfort as strengthening; encouraging, inciting; aiding, succour-
ing, and supporting. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). The same definitions include
the wife of one's bosom from Deut. 13:6 (New American Standard 1973).
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